Latest posts
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Python code for Bitcoin landfill mining article
I have converted the Analytica code in our landfill mining paper to Python: https://github.com/murrayrudd/landfill-gas-bitcoin-model. It replicates results and figures from: Rudd MA et al 2024. An integrated landfill gas-to-energy and Bitcoin mining framework. Journal of Cleaner Production 472, 143516. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2024.143516
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40 bits: what the Coldcard failure reveals about trust in Bitcoin self-custody
Drafted on Friday evening (Pacific time), 31 July 2026. This incident is developing rapidly: loss totals, entropy estimates for later devices, and attacker attribution have all shifted materially within the first 48-hours and will shift again. Figures reflect the situation as of August 1, 2026. Introduction Between 01:31 and 01:56 UTC on July 31, 2026,
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Bitcoin mining using landfill gas – model code
I have converted the Analytica code in our landfill mining paper to Python, so it is now open source at: https://github.com/murrayrudd/landfill-gas-bitcoin-model We used this model for an article published in: Rudd, M.A., Jones, M., Sechrest, D., Batten, D., Porter, D., 2024. An integrated landfill gas-to-energy and Bitcoin mining framework. Journal of Cleaner Production 472, 143516.
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Part 4. Acceleration and cross-loop failure
Part 4 introduces acceleration as the stress condition for the institutional architecture developed so far. Advances in AI accelerate the environment in which Bitcoin’s existing action arenas operate, making stress easier to recognize, and responses easier to imagine, before the relevant governance form has necessarily acquired authority to act. Chapter 10 treats AI as an
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Part 3. Temporal and monetary architecture
The case chapters showed where Bitcoin’s institutional commitments are tested. In Part 3, I ask how those commitments persist, weaken, or change form over time. The challenge moves beyond whether a particular governance form fits a particular dispute. It is whether Bitcoin continues to supply long-horizon institutional value when the surrounding environment makes exposure easier
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Part 2. Bitcoin governance cases
In the case chapters, I follow the institutional responsibilities that Bitcoin relocates. Each chapter begins from a different action arena but the same challenge arises in different situations: a Bitcoin transaction can be technically valid, economically useful, or administratively legible while the governance form needed to settle its institutional meaning remains incomplete. Relay policy shows
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Part 1. Institutional foundations
Bitcoin can be treated as a monetary asset, a protocol, or a political commitment. I treat it first as an institution: a rule-structured environment in which operational settlement can be precise while higher-level governance questions remain unsettled. The central problem is not whether Bitcoin’s code works but what happens when code settles validity without settling
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Bitcoin Mining at the Energy Edge
Summary The July 7, 2026 episode of the Isabel Foxen Duke podcast features Stephen Barbour describing Bitcoin mining as flexible load for upstream energy production. He links stranded gas monetization with modular power systems to lower waste, strengthen producer economics, and improve operational control. The wider consequence is a shift from grid-scale mining toward edge
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Chapter 07. Bitcoin’s role as temporal infrastructure
This is the July 2026 draft of chapter 07 in my new book, When Policy Falls Behind: Bitcoin, AI, and the Governance of Fast Systems. Copyright © 2026 by Murray A Rudd. A pdf version of this chapter is available at: https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.6630139 Introduction Accelerating technologies can generate operational facts, market signals, and strategic options faster than
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Bitcoin Governance and Client Diversity
Summary The April 13, 2026 episode of The Bitcoin Matrix Podcast features Josh arguing that Bitcoin Core governance concentrates repository power despite decentralized technical consensus. He identifies absent formal consensus specification and maintainer-controlled merge discretion as primary mechanisms that raise long-term governance risk. He argues that mathematically specified alternative implementations could create a more resilient